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Abstract
This article addresses complex identity-based conflicts, such as those associated with the ending of the
Cold War (e.g., Bosnia). It suggests that in many identity-based conflicts, historical memories of outrage
and victimhood ("chosen traumas") have persevered across centuries, thereby keeping the conflicting
parties "in history." The paper examines the role of virulent ethnocentrism in such intractable conflicts. It
also examines the role of "nature" and "nurture" in embedding the universal tendency for humans to divide
their species into "them" and "us" within a highly charged emotional context. The paper argues that the
complexity of these conflicts has at least four dimensions which challenge the skills and good intentions
of third parties: 1. Under stress parties' affective level (limbic brain) tends to override their cognitive level
(neocortical brain), thereby enhancing the likelihood of experiencing "feeling is believing" instead of
"seeing is believing." Parties may then not be susceptible to the efforts of third parties which often occur
at the cognitive level. Such efforts do not necessarily "trickle down" to the affective level where "chosen
traumas" are buried. 2. Third parties may have to first deal with an original, historical conflict (e.g., TurkeyArmenia, 1915) before they can deal with one of its more recent variations (Azerbaijan-Armenia, 1990s).
3. Analytically, third parties should employ comprehensive approaches to "capturing the complexity" of
historically-/identity-based conflicts. Otherwise their intentions to "do no harm" may not only fail, but may
make matters worse. 4. Effective third party intervention may then call for coordination among
"multitrack" actors performing different roles at the same or at different points in time; in effect, the
collaboration and "co-evolution" of approaches corresponding to otherwise competing paradigms (e.g.,
Political Realism, Idealism, Marxism, Non-Marxist Radical Thought [NMRT})
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PUZZLES AND CHALLENGES FOR 3rd PARTY INTERVENORS

Dennis J.D. Sandole

Abstract
This article addresses complex identity-based conflicts, such as those associated with
the ending of the Cold War (e.g., Bosnia). It suggests that in many identity-based conflicts,
historical memories of outrage and victimhood ("chosen traumas") have persevered across
centuries, thereby keeping the conflicting parties "in history." The paper examines the role of
virulent ethnocentrism in such intractable conflicts. It also examines the role of "nature" and
"nurture" in embedding the universal tendency for humans to divide their species into "them"
and "us" within a highly charged emotional context. The paper argues that
the
complexity of these conflicts has at least four dimensions which challenge the skills and good
intentions of third parties:
1.
Under stress parties' affective level (limbic brain) tends to override their
cognitive level (neocortical brain), thereby enhancing the likelihood of experiencing "feeling is
believing" instead of "seeing is believing." Parties may then not be susceptible to the efforts of
third parties which often occur at the cognitive level. Such efforts do not necessarily "trickle
down" to the affective level where "chosen traumas" are buried.
2.
Third parties may have to first deal with an original, historical conflict (e.g.,
Turkey-Armenia, 1915) before they can deal with one of its more recent variations
(Azerbaijan-Armenia, 1990s).
3.
Analytically, third parties should employ comprehensive approaches to
"capturing the complexity" of historically-/identity-based conflicts. Otherwise their intentions
to "do no harm" may not only fail, but may make matters worse.
4.
Effective third party intervention may then call for coordination among "multitrack" actors performing different roles at the same or at different points in time; in effect, the
collaboration and "co-evolution" of approaches corresponding to otherwise competing
paradigms (e.g., Political Realism, Idealism, Marxism, Non-Marxist Radical Thought
[NMRT})
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I was motivated to do this article by the return of genocide -- or genocidal conflict -to Europe (i.e., the Balkan wars of the 1990s following the collapse of Yugoslavia in June
1991) and by the subsequent inability of the conflicting parties and the international
community to translate negative peace in Bosnia -- the absence of hostilities (achieved by the
Dayton Peace Accords of October-December 1995) -- into positive peace: the elimination of
the underlying, deep-rooted causes and conditions of those wars.
In this article, I try to expand on what I call virulent ethnocentrism (Sandole, 2002a),
which reflects not only the apparently universal tendency for people across historical time
and cultural space to divide their fellow humans into "us" and "them," but to emotionally
frame the "Other" -- "them" -- in terms of intense negative affect (Sumner, 1906; LeVine &
Campbell, 1972; Tajfel, 1978, 1981).
Identity-based Conflicts
This discussion confronts the notorious "nature-nurture debate" (Wrangham &
Peterson, 1996; Pinker, 2002), noting that while the universality of ethnocentrism at least
hints at a biological basis, the variability of the referent ("target") of ethnocentrism -- which
could be based on ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, class, gender, region, or any other
point of departure (see Kuhn, 1970) -- strongly tilts in the direction of the socially
constructed.
For many of the identity-based conflicts of the post-Cold War era, the social
construction of "us" and "them" -- "friend" and "foe" -- has occurred in terms of ethnicity.
Hence, in former Yugoslavia, Serbs (Orthodox Christians), Croats (Catholics), Bosniak and
Kosovar Albanians (Muslims) were locked in brutal bloodbaths, the genocidal intensity of
which had not been seen in Europe since the end of World War II and the Holocaust.
I have mentioned the religious as well as the ethnic identities of the various groups in
the Balkans because, with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, an interesting but
earlier contentious concept created by Harvard professor Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996) -the "Clash of Civilizations" -- has apparently started to come to fruition. Through the "biteand-counterbite," action-reaction processes generated by the terrorist attacks and the U.S.-led
"War on Terror" responses to them, an actual "clash" dynamic seems to have been "selffulfillingly" launched. As I write this article, there does appear to be a new bipolar
international system developing -- a "clash" between Judaic-Christian and Islamic
"civilizations" -- replacing the multipolarity that appeared to be emerging out of the ending
of the Cold War.
Historical Memory
Ethnic conflicts clearly include dimensions in addition to ethnicity; e.g., "clashes of
civilizations cum deeply-rooted, global religious systems." What makes such conflicts so
intractable, so impervious to resolution and reconciliation, and likely to degenerate into
virulence, including genocide, is an intense collective memory of victimhood. This is often
associated with a very clear event or series of events marked by very clear dates on the
calendar; for example:
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(1)
28 June 1389 for Serbs: the fall of Serbia's "Jerusalem," Kosovo, to the Turkish
Ottoman Empire, ushering in 600 years of Turkish "Muslim" occupation of Europe.
(2)
29 May 1453 for Greeks: the fall of Constantinople to the Turkish Ottoman
Empire and its eventual "reinvention" as Istanbul.
(3)
12 July 1690 for Catholics in Ireland: defeat of the Catholic King James at the
Battle of the Boyne by Protestant King William of the House of Orange, ushering in the
structural/cultural as well as physical violence directed at the Catholics of Northern Ireland for
over 300 years (Galtung 1969, 1996; Byrne, 1997).
(4)
24 April 1915 for Armenians: the beginning of genocidal massacres of
Armenians by Turkish military forces in Istanbul and spreading throughout Eastern Anatolia,
resulting in, by 1921, some 1.5 million deaths of Armenians.
(5)
World War 2 for Jews: Nazi Germany's "final solution" of European Jewry,
resulting in the Holocaust and the deaths of some 6 million Jews and 6 million others (e.g., the
handicapped, communists, socialists, and homosexuals).
This is by no means an exhaustive list of what Vamik Volkan (1997) refers to as
"chosen traumas." Among more recent examples, we could certainly add
(6)
11 September 2001 for Americans: when 19 young men with boxcutters -- 15 of
them Saudis, but all of them Arab Wahabis -- hijacked four passenger-filled airliners, turning
three of them into cruise missiles directed at the World Trade Center in New York City and at
the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, resulting in some 3,000 fatalities.
The 5 November 2002 midterm Congressional elections in the U.S. resulted in
President Bush's Republican Party reclaiming control of the U.S. Senate and holding on to the
U.S. House of Representatives, thereby allowing the President to pursue his agenda during the
second half of his term with few congressional constraints. This, plus the relatively high level
of support among Americans for a war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, has made it clear that
11 September 2001 has eclipsed 7 December 1941 -- when Japan launched a surprise attack on
U.S. forces in Hawaii -- as the dominant "chosen trauma" for Americans.
In effect, the Bush White House has successfully invoked the functionalist dynamic of
conflict (see Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956; Sandole, 1999, p. 22), whipping up support for the
use of armed force beyond the original targets of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan and
elsewhere.
Since these dates occur with grim regularity at nonlinear, 12-month intervals as
constant reminders of particular "chosen traumas," the sense of historical (or recent)
victimhood and of bitter conflict is kept continuously alive for the identity-groups concerned in
what Volkan (1997) calls "collapsed time." This tends to keep many Serbs, Greeks, Irish
Catholics, Armenians, Jews and Americans in the grip of what Muzafer Sherif (1967) calls the
"heavy hand of the past." (Among other examples of "recent memory," a little more than a
year after 11 September 2001, on 12 October 2002, a terrorist bombing of a nightclub in Bali,
Indonesia, killed 187 people, many of them Australians.)
Few conflicts are more reflective of the operation of chosen trauma, time collapse, and
the "heavy hand of the past," than the conflict in Northern Ireland. Every summer during the
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notorious "marching season," in excess of 2000 marches, many of them which go up to,
around, and into Catholic neighborhoods, celebrate the victory by Protestants over Catholics at
the Battle of the Boyne on 12 July 1690, resulting in over 300 years of Catholic humiliation
and marginalization -- and eventually, with the advent of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and
other (including Protestant/Loyalist) paramilitary groups, terrorism.
Richard Rose (1971, pp. 354-355) eloquently captures the operation of these
phenomena in Northern Ireland with the following observation:
Londonderry on August 12, 1969, aptly illustrates how time past and
time present can fuse together in an explosive way. Protestants there that day
were commemorating the 280th anniversary of the liberation of the besieged
Protestant bastion within the old walled city from Catholic hordes surrounding
it. As they looked over Derry's walls, the marchers could see that Catholics, as
in Jacobite times, were present in great numbers in the Bogside just below their
fortifications. Catholics did not have to turn their minds further back than the
previous twelve months to anticipate what might happen next. In that period,
the Royal Ulster Constabulary several times entered the Bogside in large
numbers, assaulting Catholics on the streets and in their homes in ways that
official enquiries could later amnesty but not excuse. The Catholics began to
build barricades to prevent a recurrence of this. This recalled Protestants from
ancient history to the present. The barricades were interpreted as the beginning
of yet another Catholic insurrection. The approach of the police to the
barricades was seen by the Catholics behind the lines as yet another instance in
which Protestants sought, in the words of an eighteenth-century Irish song, to
make "Croppies lie down." In such circumstances, it hardly matters whether an
individual interpreted events in seventeenth, eighteenth or twentieth-century
terms. In Northern Ireland, the conclusions drawn -- for or against the regime -are much the same in one century as in the next (emphasis added).
Given what has become almost a mantra for some in the conflict resolution/
peacebuilding field, in such protracted, intractable, often violent conflicts, it is essential for
conflict analysts, conflict resolution practitioners, and policymakers to delve beneath
observable symptoms and to deal with the underlying relational processes, and the underlying
deep-rooted causes and conditions; lest the military and police have a never-ending supply of
symptoms to deal with.
The question arises, however: how can concerned others, potential third parties, deal
with conflicts whose origins include events that occurred hundreds of years ago, with the
original parties long gone? In other words, how can third parties help conflicting parties to
these conflicts deal with their historical wounds -- their "chosen traumas"-- and thereby, free
themselves from the "heavy hand of the past"?
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Comprehensive Analysis Prior to
Third Party Intervention into Complex
Historically/Identity-based Conflicts
Prior to attempting to do anything about any complex, identity-based conflict, it is
essential for potential third-parties to understand the conflict as comprehensively as they can;
for example:
(1) The role and strength of "nature" and "nurture" in the formation and maintenance of
identity and of identity groups and, therefore, in the initiation and escalation of violent conflict
processes, including war and terrorism. Put another way, third-parties must know something
about the nature of the "mix" between inherited "hard-wired" and "soft-wired" human nature
and variable environment/"socially constructed" culture in the etiology of enthnocentric "us""them" distinctions and violent conflict. Further, to what extent are human nature and that
"mix" changeable by the third party and other environmental contingencies? (Sandole, 1999,
pp. 180-185; Sandole, 2002b.)
(2) Under both "nature" and "nurture," the role and strength of gender. What is it, for
example, about male gender that makes males so overwhelmingly more prone to violence than
females across time and cultural space? (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996; Gilligan, 1996;
Garbarino, 2000.)
(3) Under both "nature" and "nurture," the role and strength of basic human needs
(BHNs), such as those for identity, recognition, and security, the frustration of which can lead
to violent conflict (Burton, 1997). What is it, for example, about the BHNs-frustration
interaction effect that makes violent reactions to perceived sources of BHN frustration so
compelling?
(4) The likelihood that "chosen traumas" primarily exist at the affective level, whereas
third party efforts to facilitate resolution and transformation of these conflicts occur at the
cognitive level (Boulding, 1956). How can a third-party, operating primarily at the "knowing"
level, negotiate the divide between "knowing" and "feeling" so that what is in any case
interconnected is experienced by conflicting parties as being interconnected? In other words,
must third-parties be trained psychotherapists (which presently many are not)?
(5) During times of crisis and stress, the affective (the limbic brain) overwhelms and
overtakes the cognitive (the neocortical brain), producing what Maclean (1975, 1978) calls a
schizophysiology, where "feeling is believing" instead of "seeing is believing." What can the
third-party do upon entering the turbulent "conflict space" of highly charged conflicting
parties, with each characterized by affective override, to arrest the escalatory cycle and
transform the dynamic of a "fight" into a "debate" (Rapoport, 1960)?
(6) Something like a paradigm in the same sense used by Kuhn (1970) determines our
perceptions, with members of different paradigmatic communities -- including scientific ones - often "seeing" different things when looking at the "same" thing at the same time. For
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example:
An investigator who hoped to learn something about what scientists took the
atomic theory to be asked a distinguished physicist and an eminent chemist
whether a single atom of helium was or was not a molecule. Both answered
without hesitation, but their answers were not the same. For the chemist the
atom of helium was a molecule because it behaved like one with respect to the
kinetic theory of gases. For the physicist, on the other hand, the helium atom
was not a molecule because it displayed no molecular spectrum. Presumably
both men were talking of the same particle, but they were viewing it through
their own research training and practice. Their experience in problem-solving
told them what a molecule must be. Undoubtedly their experiences had much
in common, but they did not, in this case, tell the two specialists the same thing
(emphasis added) (Kuhn 1970, pp. 50-51).
...in a famous debate between the French chemists Proust and Berthollet[, the]
first claimed that all chemical reactions occurred in fixed proportion, the latter
that they did not. Each collected impressive experimental evidence for his
view. Nevertheless, the two men necessarily talked through each other, and
their debate was entirely inconclusive. Where Berthollet saw a compound that
could vary in proportion, Proust saw only a physical mixture. To that issue
neither experiment nor a change of definitional convention could be relevant.
The two men were as fundamentally at cross-purposes as Galileo and Aristotle
had been (emphasis added) (Kuhn, 1970, p. 132).
(7) One of the apparent paradoxes of perception is that anomalies -- deviations from
paradigm-based (embedded) expectations -- that should "prescriptively" call these paradigms
into question, "descriptively" are resistant to detection, a phenomenon conducive to
maintenance of the stability of the status quo paradigmatic system. In other words, as part of
the "socially constructed" part of the "nature-nurture" mix, the paradigms that we learn and
internalize over time are usually relevant to our survival. They are not, therefore, easily
surrendered in the face of apparent contradictions; hence, the value of being "conservative"!
An additional paradox here, however, is that the anomaly may signal that the old paradigm -the old SOP (standard operating procedure) -- is no longer relevant to survival; in which case,
being conservative may be a suicidal course of action.
(8) The affective-cognitive override -- which may encourage conflicting parties to hold
on to otherwise outmoded paradigms -- occurs even for relatively minor challenges to existing
paradigms, calling into play a variety of unconscious defenses of the status quo paradigmatic
system. For example:
In a psychological experiment that deserves to be far better known outside the
trade, Bruner and Postman [1949] asked experimental subjects to identify on
short and controlled exposure a series of playing cards. Many of the cards were
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normal, but some were made anomalous, e.g., a red six of spades and a black
four of hearts. Each experimental run was constituted by the display of a single
card to a single subject in a series of gradually increased exposures. After each
exposure the subject was asked what he had seen, and the run was terminated
by two successive correct identifications.
Even on the shortest exposures many subjects identified most of the
cards, and after a small increase all the subjects identified them all. For the
normal cards these identifications were usually correct, but the anomalous
cards were almost always identified, without apparent hesitation or puzzlement,
as normal. The black four of hearts might, for example, be identified as the four
of either spades or hearts. Without any awareness of trouble, it was immediately
fitted to one of the conceptual categories prepared by prior experience. One
would not even like to say that the subjects had seen something different from
what they had identified. With a further increase of exposure to the anomalous
cards, subjects did begin to hesitate and to display awareness of anomaly.
Exposed, for example to the red six of spades, some would say: That's the six of
spades, but there's something wrong with it -- the black has a red border.
Further increase of exposure resulted in still more hesitation and confusion until
finally, and sometimes quite suddenly, most subjects would produce the correct
identification without hesitation. Moreover, after doing this with two or three of
the anomalous cards, they would have little further difficulty with the others. A
few subjects, however, were never able to make the requisite adjustment of
their categories. Even at forty times the average exposure required to recognize
normal cards for what they were, more than 10 per cent of the anomalous cards
were not correctly identified. And the subjects who then failed often
experienced acute personal distress. One of them exclaimed: "I can't make the
suit out, whatever it is. It didn't even look like a card that time. I don't know
what color it is now or whether it's a spade or a heart. I'm not even sure now
what a spade looks like. My God!" (emphasis added) (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 62-64).
Given a conflict characterized by the "affective-cognitive override," the parties may be
inhabitants of a turbulent, highly charged "conflict space," where there is a perceptualemotional as well as cross-cultural gap between conflicting parties and third parties. How does
the third party negotiate across these chasms in order to be an effective agent for the parties
"letting go of the past"?
(9) In order to help resolve a current version of a conflict characterized by these gaps, a
potential third party may have to deal first with a related historical conflict. For example, in the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (an Armenian area in Azerbaijan),
Armenians tend to "see" Azerbaijanis as "Turks." Consequently, Armenians see that Armenia
with a population of 2-3 million (and 3-4 million Armenians in the diaspora), is surrounded by
7 million "Turks" in Azerbaijan, plus 63 million Turks in Turkey, for a total of 70 million
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Turks surrounding 2-3 million Armenians. Against this David and Goliath background, they
also see the Azeri "Turks" as trying to "finish off the job they started in 1915!"
In this particular scenario, dealing effectively with the Armenian-Turkish conflict
relationship (perhaps the first genocide of the 20th Century) may be a necessary condition for
dealing effectively with the subsequent (and current) conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan.
Interestingly, Canadian Armenian film director, Atom Egoyan, in his new film,
Ararat, which is about 24 April 1915, seems to convey the need for Turkey to acknowledge
what happened to the Armenians 87 years ago. In a sense, "It haunts Egoyan, as well as most
other Armenians, that to this day there's been no real coming to account with the Turks [about
1915]" (Hunter, 2002, p. G4; Kennicott, 2002).
Complexity Theory
To deal with complex, identity-based conflicts, complexity theory may be useful. A
major tenet of complexity theory is that "everything is connected to everything else." Its
primary focus is the "edge of chaos" which represents a complex balance between chaos
(disorder and unpredictability) and order (predictability) (see Waldrop, 1992).
Whenever a third party enters into the turbulent, constantly shifting, high energy
"conflict space" of the parties, he, she or they are confronted by this complex interplay
between chaos and order. Depending upon the paradigmatic base of the third party, they may
elect to use force to suppress the violent manifestations -- the symptoms -- of the conflict in
order to achieve and maintain negative peace (Realpolitik: "political realism").
Alternatively, third parties may attempt to mediate an end to hostilities and then
establish opportunities for the parties to deal with the underlying deep-rooted causes and
conditions, by facilitating promises by the originally more powerful and privileged party to
permit access to political, social, economic and other resources to which the less powerful and
privileged party has previously been denied access in order to achieve and maintain positive
peace (e.g., Idealpolitik: "political idealism"; Marxism; non-Marxist radical thought)
(Sandole, 1993, 1999 [Ch. 6]).
Another alternative would be for a creative third party to realize that to "capture the
complexity of conflict," it is not a simple matter of reflecting, for instance, "either realism or
idealism," but a combination of appropriate elements of both -- of otherwise competing
paradigms -- to maintain the careful balance at the "edge of chaos" between disorder and
order.
For example, in mid-April 1994, after a genocidal bloodbath began in Rwanda, it
would have been essential for the international community to respond favorably to Major
General Romeo Dallaire's "early warnings" and pleas to reinforce his lightly armed UN
contingent to suppress and prevent genocide (Power, 2001, 2002), before introducing less
coercive, more conciliatory types of intervention.
When the third party does intervene via the more conciliatory processes, they may,
again, have to deal with fairly recent as well as earlier memories and experiences of
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victimhood in order to help the parties "let go of [even the recent] past," in order for them to
deal with the present. What "best practices" exist for third parties to employ here (again,
keeping in mind that "best practices" may reflect, even for third parties, dangerously
outmoded, unconsciously defended paradigmatic belief and value systems)? A truth and
reconciliation process like that in South Africa? (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2002, 2003.) Story
telling? (Senehi, 2000, 2002.) In any case, how do we, as third parties who wish to "do no
harm" and "make a difference," negotiate our way from the cognitive (neocortical) to the
affective (limbic) level of the traumatized, highly charged conflicting parties?
The answer here may be an appropriately complex one, with profound implications for
coordinated, "multi-track" third party interventions (Byrne & Carter, 1996; Diamond &
McDonald, 1996; Byrne & Keashly, 2000; Fisher & Keashly, 1991; Fisher, 1997 [Ch. 8];
Sandole, 1998). In addition to launching "mini-Marshall Plans" to assist in the political and
economic aspects of peacebuilding -- no easy feat; just consider the present situation in
Afghanistan (WP, 2002b; Burnett, 2003) -- third parties may have to have "psychoanalytical
access" to the parties to help them overcome resistances to detecting anomalies. Thus, I have
written previously that (Sandole, 1987, p. 296):
Once individuals in conflict -- whether at the interpersonal, intergroup,
interorganizational, international or any other level -- start to express
themselves through [violence], they may become brutalized, unable to view
their "enemies" as anything but despicable subhumans. Under such
circumstances, which can lead to an extension of the conflict beyond the lives
of its original participants, potential third parties who wish to intervene
effectively must be able to operate at the intrapsychic as well as interparty
levels. Unless the first is dealt with adequately, the second may only worsen.
In this manner, the parties can go through the emotional-psychological aspects of
peacebuilding -- mourning, healing, reconciliation -- and develop what Benjamin Broome
(1993) calls relational empathy: a "third culture" or "meta-paradigm" interconnecting, in
"complex" fashion, their otherwise competing cultures or paradigms.
Conclusion
Although this paper has attempted to lay out a creative paradigm for third party
intervenors to assist conflicting parties in mending historical wounds and engage them in
peacebuilding, it is easier said than done. But, to gain some sense of closure here, let's revisit
the Balkan wars, especially in Bosnia, where we began this article:
What does it take for outside powers to rebuild a war-ruined and badly
divided country? Bosnia offers a state-of-the-art -- and sobering -- example.
Seven years after a U.S. intervention helped end its civil war and Western
troops poured in to keep the peace, the Balkan nation of 3.5 million remains far
from able to live on its own. The good news is that the horrific fighting that
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killed a quarter of a million people in less than four years has not been renewed,
that several hundred thousand refugees and victims of ethnic cleansing have
returned to their homes, and that peaceful and free elections were held [last]
month [October 2002] for all levels of government -- the sixth elections to be
staged in as many years. But the [negative] peace continues to depend on
12,000 foreign troops, including 2,000 Americans; the functioning of
government relies in no small part on the interventions of a Western "high
representative" with near-dictatorial powers; and, most discouraging of all, the
victors in the recent elections were the same nationalist [ethnocentric] parties
that tore the country apart a decade ago. Bosnia is not now a failed state, but it
is a center for the trafficking of women and narcotics, a hide-out for war
criminals and a steady drain on Western aid and defense budgets. It's not likely
to collapse soon, but neither will foreign troops and administrators likely be
able to safely pull out for many years to come (WP, 2002a).
Just imagine multiple "Bosnias" -- in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Palestine -- with
Muslims the major victims, and the costs will likely include other factors besides a drain on
defense budgets: a further erosion of the Westphalian state system into the "Coming Anarchy"
that Robert D. Kaplan (1994, 2000) so accurately, but depressingly presaged, with wars
becoming more "local," more subnational and more like the wars of medieval Europe, where:
any fine distinctions ... between armies on the one hand and peoples on the
other [are] bound to break down. Engulfed by war, civilians [will suffer]
terrible atrocities (van Creveld, 1991, p. 51).
We have already seen this future: two months after Kaplan's (1994) "The Coming
Anarchy" appeared in Atlantic Monthly, in Rwanda in April 1994, approximately half a million
people, Tutsis and moderate Hutus, were savagely murdered at a low tech level of "medieval"
warfare (Abdulai, 1994, p. 38; Power, 2001, 2002).
A little more than a year later, in July 1995, the event that precipitated NATO taking
action to end the war in Bosnia occurred: Bosnian Serb forces entered the UN protected "safe
area" of Srebrenica, disarmed the lightly armed Dutch UNPROFOR (United Nations
"Protection" Force) contingent, separated the men from the women and massacred between
6,000 to 8,000 Bosniak Muslim males (see Honig and Both, 1996; Rohde, 1997).
Such is the daunting challenge facing third parties committed to positive peace
throughout the world: seven years after the horrors of Srebrenica, nationalist parties have been
returned to power in Bosnia. What would it take to help them let go of the "heavy hand of the
past"?
Sometimes people say that there are some conflicts that just cannot be dealt with,
except in Realpolitik, coercive fashion, which, of course, often makes matters worse. That
seems to be the case with, among others, the U.S.-Iraq conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
and the Russian-Chechen conflict. So, the question that arises here is: is it the case that some
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people are, in the words of Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992), forever consigned to "being in
history"?
As the world moves progressively and perhaps unrelentingly toward further
realization of Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations," this is no longer just an academic
question: as weapons of mass destruction are amassed against the background of that
dangerous simplification, they are more likely to be used in the name of God -- the ultimate
terrorism!
Notes
1. This article builds upon Sandole (2002a). Earlier comments by Dr. Sean Byrne and two
anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged and appreciated!
2. See Pearson (2001) for elements of third-party approaches to identity-based conflicts.
3. See Bracken & Petty (1998) on the problems associated with the use of Western
approaches to trauma in other parts of the world where violent conflict has occurred.
4. See Hunter (1998) for an examination of "the future state of relations between Islam and
the West." Also, see Gopin (2000, 2002) on the relationships between religion, violence, and
peacemaking, especially in the Middle East. Finally, see Appleby (2000) for a
comprehensive exploration of the factors predisposing "religious militants" toward violent
responses to conflict situations versus factors that encourage them to respond nonviolently in
a peacebuilding mode.
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